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Policy context 
• Law enforcement agencies worldwide prioritize 
cocaine (and other drug) trafficking 
– To reduce supply and, thus, consumption of drugs  
– Because of involvement of organized crime (OC) and 
related harms of violence, corruption, money laundering 
• Literature suggests improbability of supply reduction 
– Policy bodies and scholars increasingly call for supply-
oriented applications of harm reduction principles 
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Research questions 
• What harms are associated with trafficking? 
– How severe and frequent are they? 
– What causes them? 
– Can we identify patterns across venues? 
• Do harms of trafficking justify prioritization? 
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Comparison of two cases 
Belgium (BE) The Netherlands (NL) 
Market position Major entry point for EU Major entry point for EU 
Sources of evidence 
Criminal proceedings 52 2003-2009 10 2001-2011 
Organized crime 
database files 
81 total;  
42 additional 
2006-2008 -- -- 
Official reports and 
statistics 
Yes Various Yes Various 
Interviews 
Law enforcement 
experts 
15 2010-2011 28 2011-2012 
Imprisoned 
traffickers/dealers 
12 2010-2011 13 2011-2012 
Scientific literature and 
media reports 
Yes Various Yes Various 
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Identify possible harms and bearers 
(taxonomy) 
Rate 
severity 
of harm 
(scale) 
Establish causality of harm 
Rate 
incidence of 
criminal activity 
and of harm in 
relation to 
criminal activity 
(scale) 
Construct business model 
Prioritize harms 
(matrix) 
Harm assessment framework 
Evaluate severity and  
incidence of harm 
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Export
Import
Wholesale 
distribution
Dealing Use
Country
i.e., BE or NL
(inside “egg”)
Money laundering, 
threat or use of 
violence, corruption
Dealing
(retail)
Trafficking
(wholesale)
R.O.W. 
(outside “egg”)
Sea,
air,
land
Not studied in NL 
Key: R.O.W.= 
Rest of world 
Analysis considers harms within borders 
Not studied 
in NL or BE 
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Business models in BE and NL similar 
• Imports far exceed consumption in both countries 
• Cocaine enters mainly via air (Schiphol, Brussels) and sea 
(Rotterdam, Antwerp), using like tactics 
• Trafficking over land occurs between NL and BE and to/from 
other markets, but open borders impede detection  
 Data on wholesale distribution and export are sketchy, but 
NL plays greater distributional role, with more exchanges 
• Little evidence of government corruption in either country, 
but facilitation occurs in logistics sector 
• Revenues largely smuggled or stashed, but some laundering 
occurs through businesses and investment 
 Limited violence in both countries, but violence in NL might 
be somewhat greater than in BE 
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NL is “hub” not just entry point 
• Large shipments entering BE and NL are cut 
and repackaged in NL for further distribution 
throughout Europe 
• Several NL-based traffickers orchestrate 
shipments along entire supply chain 
– Have origin in and/or links to former Dutch 
colonies in Central America 
– Represent Colombian organizations 
– Maintain high-level intercontinental contacts 
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Evidence of violence in NL 
• Criminal proceedings provide evidence of violence/ 
threats in NL, mostly among traffickers 
̶ E.g., planned murder, blackmailing, rip-deals, kidnapping 
̶ Seizures of weapons or armored cars 
• Experts confirm picture and add some cases of fatal 
violence and of fatal accidents (7 in last 10 years) in NL  
• Convicted traffickers also indicate use of violence 
̶ Six of 13 were victims/offenders of serious violence, 2 witnesses  
̶ One trafficker convicted of murder in cocaine conflict 
• WODC monitor indicates average of 10 drug-related (non-
specific, incl. users) violent deaths/year in 1992-2009 
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Identify possible harms and bearers 
(taxonomy) 
Rate 
severity 
of harm 
(scale) 
Establish causality of harm 
Rate 
incidence of 
criminal activity 
and of harm in 
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criminal activity 
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Prioritize harms 
(matrix) 
Working through harm assessment process 
Evaluate severity and  
incidence of harm 
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Taxonomy delineates types and bearers 
SOURCE: Authors (2013) drawing from von Hirsch and Jareborg (1991) and others. 
NOTES: X = applicable; n/a = not applicable; 
* Functional integrity = Physical and psychological integrity; 
** Functional integrity = Operational integrity; 
*** Functional integrity = Physical, operational, and aesthetic integrity 
BEARER OF HARM 
Individuals 
Private-
Sector 
Entities 
Government 
Entities Environment 
TYPE OF HARM 
Functional integrity X* X** X** X*** 
Material interests X X X n/a 
Reputation X X X n/a 
Privacy X X X n/a 
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Possible harms span individuals, 
entities, and interests 
Trafficking 
Money 
laundering 
Corruption Violence 
Functional 
integrity 
Ind (LL) 
PVT 
PVT* 
GVT (NL only) 
PVT 
GVT 
Ind (LL) 
Material 
interests 
Ind 
PVT 
GVT 
PVT (NL only) 
PVT 
GVT 
Ind 
GVT 
Reputation 
Ind 
PVT 
GVT 
PVT* 
GVT 
PVT 
GVT 
Ind 
GVT 
“Privacy”  
Ind 
PVT 
GVT (NL only) 
PVT 
GVT 
n/a 
NOTES: Ind = Individual; LL = including loss of life; PVT = private sector;  
GVT = Government; NL =  Netherlands; n/a = not applicable. 
*Omitted from our prior (published) analysis of cocaine trafficking in Belgium. 16 
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SEVERITY 
RATING 
Level of individual’s living standard 
at which damage occurs 
Level of entity’s  mission capability at 
which damage occurs 
Catastrophic 1˚: Subsistence, consisting of 
survival, but with maintenance of 
no more than elementary 
capacities to function 
1˚: Viability, consisting of survival,  
but with maintenance of no more than 
elementary capacities to function 
Grave 2˚: Minimal standard of living  2˚: Minimal mission capabilities  
Serious 3˚: Adequate standard of living 3˚: Adequate mission capabilities 
Moderate 4˚: Enhanced standard of living 4˚: Enhanced mission capabilities   
Marginal Negligible or no effect at any level Negligible or no effect at any level 
Common benchmarks gauge severity 
SOURCES: Authors (2013) drawing from von Hirsch and Jareborg’s (1991), living 
standard approach, and Sen’s (1987) work on capabilities. 
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Incidence provides grounding  
for prioritizing harms 
Matrix of severity, incidence, and priorities 
SEVERITY INCIDENCE 
Continuously Persistently Occasionally Seldom Rarely 
Catastrophic VH H H H/M M/H 
Grave H H H/M M/H M 
Serious H H/M M/H M L 
Moderate H/M M/H M L L 
Marginal M/H M L L L 
SOURCE: Authors based on Greenfield and Camm (2005), US Army (2001, 2014). 
NOTES: VH = very high; H = high; M = medium; L = Low priority. 
Cocaine trafficking persistent in BE and NL (daily, weekly) 
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Actual harms to individuals similar in NL & BE* 
Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity 
Loss of life Catastrophic Rarely H/MI 
- Trafficking (i.e., fatal injuries to body packers) 
- Trafficking (i.e., fatal accidents) (NL only))  
- Violence in trafficking (e.g., murder) (NL only) 
Other  
physical and 
psychological 
Grave Rarely MI 
- Trafficking (i.e., non-fatal injuries to body packers) 
- Violence in trafficking (e.g., assault) 
Serious Rarely LI " 
Moderate 
Seldom (NL) 
Rarely (BE) 
LI " 
Marginal 
Seldom to  
Occasionally (NL) 
Rarely to seldom (BE) 
LI - Violence in trafficking (e.g., petty assault) 
Marginal Rarely LI - Trafficking (i.e., non-fatal injuries to body packers) 
Only psychological Marginal Occasionally LI 
- Trafficking (i.e., non-fatal injuries to body packers) 
- Violence in trafficking (e.g., intimidation) 
Reputation 
Moderate See above*** LI - Violence in trafficking (e.g., assault) 
Marginal See above*** LI - Violence in trafficking (e.g., petty assault, intimidation) 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with cocaine dealing and use.  
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to activities. 
***Maps to incidence of episodes of violence. 
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Actual harms to others similar in NL & BE* 
Severity Incidence** Priority Activity 
HARMS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity 
Marginal  Occasionally LPS - Corruption in trafficking 
Marginal Rarely LPS - Money laundering (NL only) 
Material interests Marginal Rarely LPS - Money laundering (NL only) 
Reputation  
Marginal Occasionally LPS - Corruption in trafficking 
Marginal Rarely LPS - Money laundering (NL only) 
“Privacy” Marginal Occasionally LPS - Corruption in trafficking  
HARMS TO GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, specifically to their: 
Functional integrity Marginal Rarely LG 
- Corruption in trafficking  
- Money laundering (NL only) 
Material interests 
Moderate See above*** LG 
- Trafficking  and violence (i.e., medical treatment of  
 fatal and non-fatal overdoses and assaults) 
Marginal See above*** LG - Violence (i.e., medical treatment of petty assaults)  
Reputation 
Marginal Rarely  LG 
- Corruption in trafficking  
- Money laundering (NL only) 
Marginal Persistently MG - All criminal activities (i.e., non-enforcement effect) 
*Estimates exclude harms associated with cocaine dealing and use.  
**Overall incidence, accounting for incidence of activities and of harms in relation to activities. 
***Maps to incidence of episodes of overdose and/or violence. 
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Policy plays substantial role in non-
use-related harms, other harms TBD 
• Most non-use-related, direct harms arise from illegal 
status and specific enforcement practices 
– Harms associated with trafficking, violence, money 
laundering, and corruption studied in BE and NL 
– Harms of dealing studied only in BE 
• Use-related harms are “remote” and to-be-determined 
– To what extent are they really caused by trafficking? 
– Some harms arise from properties of drug, but policy, modes 
of enforcement, etc. also play part 
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Summary of findings 
• Harms of trafficking mostly “L,” with few exceptions, 
despite large flows* and OC involvement 
– Difference in role (hub and exchanges), might, speculatively, 
explain higher incidence of violence in NL, but 
– Not enough difference to yield higher priority rankings 
• Harms appear to accrue largely in relation to risks and 
opportunities for compensation across venues 
• Harms of trafficking mostly due to drug-control policy 
and law enforcement practices in both venues 
*Use-related harms likely much larger, but they are “remote” 
and not assessed in this analysis 24 
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Insights for policy 
• Neither flows nor OC involvement constitute 
strong indicators of priority 
• Trafficking, per se, might not warrant 
prioritization on basis of non-use harm 
• If policy “works” by inserting compensable 
risk, then related harms might be unavoidable 
What are alternatives? 
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Back up slides 
As in BE, cocaine entering NL far 
exceeds consumption 
• National Crime Squad (2004) estimates 4-5.4 tons of 
cocaine consumed annually in NL  
• Seizures registered by Dutch police between 2000 and 
2010 range from 6.4 tons in 2000 to 17.6 tons in 2003 
• National Crime Squad (2004) suggests that 40-50 tons 
of cocaine enter NL each year 
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As in BE, cocaine enters NL mainly via 
air and sea routes 
• 75% of seizures involve air route (WCO, 2004) 
• 79% of quantities seized is transported by sea (WCO, 2012) 
• Main entry points are Rotterdam Port and Schiphol airport 
– Antwerp port and Brussels airport are “pendants” in BE  
• Much less known about land route and other ports, airports 
– Dutch police have little information on, smaller airports and ports, 
inland navigation, trafficking over land 
– Belgian data shows that considerable share of cocaine smuggled 
through Antwerp is meant for NL 
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Sea route NL: Rotterdam port 
• Largest container port of Europe—11 million 
containers passed through in 2010  
• Cocaine arrives on ships, mostly 
– In containers 
– “Hitchhiking” on legitimate ships 
– With cooperation of local port workers/ 
crew of sea vessels 
• Seizures range from few kilograms to several tons 
• At least 14 cocaine ‘secondary extraction’ 
laboratories found in NL in 2005-2007 
– Three deaths since 2001 (no lab information for BE) 
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Air route NL: Schiphol airport  
• Cocaine arrives mainly from Latin America and Caribbean   
• Smuggling by passengers 
– 3,934 couriers arrested in 2007-2009  under ‘100% control policy’ of 
flights from Venezuela, Peru, etc. (2003+)  
– Cocaine is hidden in luggage, on/in body 
• At least five body-packers  have died since 2008  
• In  2010, police spent work 2,200 hours in the hospital 
– 27 Schiphol employees arrested for complicity in 2007-2011 
• Smuggling by cargo 
– Cocaine is sent in mail packages or hidden in containers  
– At least 46 episodes of involvement of Schiphol employees (e.g., 
baggage handlers) in cargo smuggling each year in 2007-11 
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As in BE, little corruption in NL 
government, but facilitation in logistics 
• Proceedings, including additional bribery proceedings (2003-
2007), expert interviews provide little evidence of drug-related 
government corruption 
• Proceedings describe non-governmental facilitation 
̶ Crews of sea vessels 
̶ Employees of Schiphol airport 
̶ Employees of other transportation and dispatching companies 
̶ Lawyers and other professionals* 
• Most traffickers report no experience with corruption  
̶ Four mentioned corruption in private sector and two in public sector 
*One government employee (bookkeeper) also served as financial facilitator. 
See related point on financial facilitation and “money laundering.” 34 
As in BE, money in NL often smuggled or 
stashed, but also laundered directly 
• Large amounts of money smuggled to other countries  
• Money that stays in NL is 
– Hidden as cash 
– Spent on luxury goods  
– Invested in real estate, (shell) companies, hotel/catering firms 
• Employees hide origin of money in fake transactions 
• Lawyers, notaries, accountants, and other professionals 
also serve, at times, as “financial facilitators”* 
*One government employee (bookkeeper) also served as financial facilitator. 
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Analyze 
mission 
List hazards List causes 
Step 2: Assess hazards 
Assess 
severity 
Assess 
probability 
Determine 
risk level 
Step 3: Develop controls and 
make risk decisions 
Develop controls, 
determine residual risk, 
and make risk decisions 
 
Step 5: Supervise and review 
Step 4: Implement controls 
Develop new 
controls 
5-Step Risk Management Process 
Source: Based on Greenfield and Camm (2005: 47), citing military doctrine. 
Step 1: Identify hazards and associated “bad consequences” 
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Possible harms, individuals (NL, BE) 
Traffic 
Money 
laundering 
Corruption Violence Bearers 
Functional 
integrity 
(Loss of life) 
X n/a n/a X 
Body-packers and, in NL, other 
traffickers in cases of fatal injuries, fatal 
accidents (e.g., explosions of extraction 
labs), suicides or murders 
Functional 
integrity 
(Other) 
X n/a n/a n/a 
Body-packers and other traffickers in 
cases of nonfatal injuries, other persons 
misused without consent   
n/a n/a n/a X 
Traffickers, facilitators, and government 
officials targeted by use or threat of 
violence 
Material 
interests 
X n/a n/a X 
Ancillary to functional harms (health) 
Reputation 
X n/a n/a n/a Persons misused without consent   
n/a n/a n/a X 
Traffickers, facilitators and government 
officials targeted by use or threat of 
violence 
“Privacy”   X n/a n/a n/a Persons misused without consent   37 
Possible harms, private-sector entities (NL, BE) 
Traffic 
Money 
laundering 
Corruption Violence Bearers 
Functional 
integrity 
X n/a X n/a 
Transport/import businesses, e.g. if 
corrupt officials/employees or 
traffickers misuse assets 
n/a X* n/a n/a 
Companies of lawyers and accountants 
facilitating money laundering 
Material 
interests 
X 
X 
(NL only) 
X n/a 
Ancillary to functional harms (property) 
and independent (e.g., property, wages 
associated with neglect of duties) 
Reputation 
 
X n/a X n/a 
Transport/import businesses, e.g. if 
corrupt officials/employees or 
traffickers misuse assets, even if 
businesses are unaware of exploitation 
n/a X* n/a n/a 
Companies of lawyers and accountants 
facilitating money laundering 
“Privacy”  X n/a X n/a 
Transport/import businesses, e.g. if 
corrupt officials/employees or 
traffickers misuse assets  
*Omitted from our prior (published) analysis of cocaine trafficking in Belgium. 
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Traffic 
Money 
laundering 
Corruption Violence Bearers 
Functional 
integrity 
 
n/a 
 
X 
(NL only) 
X n/a 
Government agencies, i.e., if 
officials/representatives engage in 
corrupt practices, incl. neglect of 
duties, and money laundering 
Material 
interests 
X n/a X X* 
Ancillary to functional harms (health) 
and independent (e.g., wages 
associated with neglect of duties) 
Reputation 
n/a 
X 
(NL only) 
X n/a 
Government agencies, i.e., if 
officials/representatives engage in 
corrupt practices, incl. neglect of 
duties, and money laundering 
X X X X 
Government writ large, if it cannot 
enforce its laws 
“Privacy”  n/a 
X 
(NL only) 
X n/a 
Government agencies, i.e., if 
officials/representatives engage in 
corrupt practices, incl. neglect of 
duties, and money laundering  
Possible harms, government (NL, BE) 
*Omitted from our prior (published) analysis of cocaine trafficking in Belgium. 
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As in BE, cocaine trafficking in NL is 
persistent criminal activity 
• National Crime Squad (2004) suggests that 40-50 
tons of cocaine enters the Netherlands each year 
– 20+ tons of cocaine might enter and/or transit BE through 
Antwerp each year (U.S. State Department, 2006 and 2010)  
• Trafficking  is at least “persistent” given 
– Variability of shipment quantities (grams to tons) 
– Frequency of seizures, and  
– Market position of NL relative to BE 
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